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When Women’s Silence Is Reasonable
REFORMING THE FARAGHER/ELLERTH DEFENSE
IN THE #METOO ERA
INTRODUCTION
In October 2017, hundreds of thousands of women broke
their silence
1
following investigations by the New York Times and
the New Yorker into Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein’s
decades-long pattern of sexual harassment and assault.
2
Women
posted on Twitter and Facebook, telling their long-buried stories of
being sexually harassed or assaulted, or simply posting the phrase
#MeToo.
3
As the #MeToo movement grew, allegations brought by
female employees against powerful and famous men led to their
disgrace, resignation, firing, and (sometimes) criminal prosecution,
and in December 2017, Time magazine honored the Silence
Breakers—the women who came forward to accuse their
harassers—as its “Person of the Year.”
4
The press shined a spotlight
on what many women have always known: sexual harassment in
1
Samantha Schmidt, #MeToo: Harvey Weinstein Case Moves Thousands to Tell
TheirOwnStories of Abuse, BreakSilence,WASH.POST (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/10/16/me-too-alyssa-milano-urged-assault-victims-to-
tweet-in-solidarity-the-response-was-massive/?utm_term=.1e54556c1ab4 [https://perma.cc/C7
CD-EPCS]. The #MeToomovement was originally launched by Tarana Burke in 2006, with the
goal of drawing attention to women of color’s experiences of sexual harassment and sexual
violence. Tarana Burke, #MeToo Founder Tarana Burke on the Rigorous Work that Still Lies
Ahead, VARIETY (2018), https://variety.com/2018/biz/features/tarana-burke-metoo-one-year-
later-1202954797/ [https://perma.cc/T8K7-7Z4P].
2
Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual
Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/5W3M-
ZKKF]; Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s
Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-
accusers-tell-their-stories [https://perma.cc/MW2K-FBEQ].
3
Schmidt, supra note 1.
4
Stephanie Zacharek et al., Person of the Year 2017: The Silence Breakers,
TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/
[https://perma.cc/5MPG-Y47G].
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theworkplace is incredibly common, and affectswomen across social
classes—frommovie stars to fast food workers.
5
Following #MeToo, official complaints of workplace sexual
harassment have increased.
6
But when these claims make their
way to courts, victims are confronted with a legal scheme that
makes it very difficult for them to hold anyone, including their
employers, accountable.
7
While sexual harassment has been
recognized since the 1980s as a form of sex discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
8
subsequent developments
in sexual harassment law favor employers.
9
One problematic
element of the doctrine is the Faragher/Ellerth defense, established
by theU.S. SupremeCourt in 1998.
10
The Faragher/Ellerth defense
applies in hostile work environment cases when no tangible
employment action, such as firing or demotion, has been taken
against the complaining employee, and shields employers from
liability if: (1) “the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior” and (2) “the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or
to avoid harm otherwise.”
11
5
See Bryce Covert, The Radical Boldness of the McDonald’s Sexual Harassment
Strike, CUT (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/09/mcdonalds-sexual-harass
ment-strike-takes-place-in-10-cities.html [https://perma.cc/SG2F-TV52].
6
Suzanne Lucas,How the #MeTooMovement Is Making an Impact on Workplace
SexualHarassment Policy, HRACUITY (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.hracuity.com/blog/metoo-
impact-workplace [https://perma.cc/Z79H-VBS9] (noting fifty-three percent of businesses saw
an increase in sexual harassment complaints after #MeToo); Alex Press, Women Are Filing
MoreHarassment Claims in the #MeTooEra. They’re Also FacingMoreRetaliation, VOX (May
9, 2019), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2019/5/9/18541982/sexual-harassment-me-too-ee
oc-complaints [https://perma.cc/5TKM-4JAR] (noting complaints of sexual harassment made
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission rose by 13.6% in 2018).
7
Rafia Zakaria, The Legal System Needs to Catch Up with the #MeToo
Movement, NATION (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-legal-system-
needs-to-catch-up-with-the-metoo-movement/ [https://perma.cc/P76S-6E36].
8
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
9
Zakaria, supra note 7.
10
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
11
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The Faragher/Ellerth
defense applies only to hostile work environments created by supervisors. When a hostile
work environment is created by a plaintiff’s coworker, the employer is liable if it was
“negligent in failing to prevent harassment from taking place.” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570
U.S. 421, 432, 448–49 (2013). This requires a showing that the employer “knewor should have
known about the conduct and failed to stop it.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. While harassment by
coworkers is a significant problem in the workplace, employer liability for such harassment
is outside the scope of this note. Although the Faragher/Ellerth defense was formulated in
two sexual harassment cases, it can also be raised in cases of hostilework environments based
on race or national origin. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Lakeland, 318 F. App’x 730, 737 (11th Cir.
2008) (concluding, on the basis of the Faragher/Ellerth defense, that plaintiffs’ failure to
complain through employer’s process was “fatal” to their claims).
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Courts have interpreted this two-prong defense in a
manner that allows employers to easily escape liability in cases
where victims have been silent. Courts find the first prong of the
defense—“exercis[ing] reasonable care to prevent and correct”
sexual harassment
12
—to be met when employers have policies
against sexual harassment and have established internal
complaint procedures.
13
Courts find the second prong of the
defense—that the plaintiff employee acted “unreasonably”—to be
met when the harassed employee has either not reported the
harassment through these procedures, or has delayed in doing so.
14
But this interpretation of the defense ignores the realities that
many employer antiharassment policies and procedures do not
effectively prevent harassment from occurring
15
and the majority
of people who experience harassment at work do not report it.
16
Indeed, only six to thirteen percent of those who experience
harassment at work make a formal complaint to their employer.
17
Courts thus reward employers for adopting policies and
procedures against sexual harassment that are wholly ineffective,
and punish victims of harassment for not reporting promptly
through these flawed internal channels, even though this is not a
common response to harassment.
18
When a victim does not react
in this narrowly prescribed way, the employer escapes liability
altogether, leaving the victim without any remedy because Title
VII allows for claims to be pursued only against employers, not
individual harassers.
19
The incredible force of the #MeToo movement has created
momentum for long-overdue reform of workplace sexual
harassment laws. Now, Congress must act to eliminate or reform
the Faragher/Ellerth defense. Part I of this note gives the history
12
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
13
See, e.g., Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 329 (3d Cir. 2015);
Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th Cir. 2009); Baldwin v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1307 (11th Cir. 2007).
14
See, e.g., Jones, 796 F.3d at 329; Pinkerton, 563 F.3d at 1063; Baldwin, 480
F.3d at 1307.
15
See, e.g., CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITYCOMM’N, REPORT OF THECO-CHAIRS OF THEEEOCSELECTTASKFORCE ON
THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THEWORKPLACE, at v (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZWX-9YQH] (“Much of the
training done over the last [thirty] years has not worked as a prevention tool . . . .”).
16
See id. (“Roughly three out of four individualswho experiencedharassment never
even talked to a supervisor, manager, or union representative about the harassing conduct.”).
17
Id. at 16.
18
See id. at v (“The least common response of either men or women to
harassment is to take some form of formal action—either to report the harassment
internally or file a formal legal complaint.”).
19
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (imposing liability for an unlawful employment
practice on “an employer”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining employer as “a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees”).
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of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination, explains the
origin of the Faragher/Ellerth defense, and traces the troubling
way courts have interpreted the defense in situations in which the
employee has not formally complained. Part II discusses a 2018
case from the Third Circuit, Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, in
which the court responded directly to the #MeToo movement and
departed significantly from precedent in applying the
Faragher/Ellerth defense.
20
Part III proposes two ways Congress
can legislate to reform the Faragher/Ellerth defense: (1)
eliminating it so that employers are held strictly liable for sexual
harassment by supervisors, or (2) reforming it to raise the bar
employers must meet when demonstrating preventive efforts and
to widen the range of victim responses considered reasonable. This
note concludes by calling on Congress to turn the cultural
transformation of attitudes toward sexual harassment into a
transformation of the law as well.
I. SEXUALHARASSMENT AND THE FARAGHER/ELLERTH
DEFENSE
A. Recognition of “Hostile Work Environment” as Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII
The theory of sex discrimination now known as hostile
work environment was originally conceived of by Catharine
MacKinnon in her landmark 1979 book, Sexual Harassment of
Working Women.
21
MacKinnon identified two kinds of sexual
harassment: “quid pro quo” harassment, in which a benefit of
employment is conditioned upon the employee’s submission to
sexual advances, and “condition of work” harassment, in which
“sexual harassment simply makes the work environment
unbearable.”
22
In “condition of work” harassment,
[u]nwanted sexual advances, made simply because she has a
woman’s body, can be a daily part of a woman’s work life. She may be
constantly felt or pinched, visually undressed and stared at,
surreptitiously kissed, commented upon, manipulated into being
found alone, and generally taken advantage of at work—but never
promised or denied anything explicitly connected with her job.
23
In 1980, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
(EEOC) issued guidelines defining sexual harassment as a form
20
SeeMinarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 313–14 (3d Cir. 2018).
21
See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUALHARASSMENT OFWORKINGWOMEN
32–33, 40 (1979); GILLIAN THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX 86–87 (2016).
22
MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 32–33, 40.
23
Id. at 40.
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of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, including when “such conduct has the purpose or
effect of . . . creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.”
24
Notably, these guidelines imposed strict liability
on an employer for acts of “its agents and supervisory employees
with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the
specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by
the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known of their occurrence.”
25
Six years later, in 1986, the Supreme Court recognized
sexual harassment that has created a “hostile or abusive work
environment” as a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title
VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.
26
But the Court
limited employers’ liability for hostile work environments in two
key ways. First, it held that a hostile work environment is only
actionable when it is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive
working environment.’”
27
Second, the Court declined to adopt the
EEOC’s strict-liability rule for harassment by supervisors.
Instead of giving a definitive test for when an employer will be
vicariously liable for supervisory harassment, the Court directed
the lower courts to look to common-law “agency principles for
guidance,”
28
instructing lower courts to find a middle ground
between strict liability and allowing an employer to escape
liability merely because the employer did not have notice of the
harassment.
29
Crucially, the Court rejected the employer’s
argument that it should be shielded from liability due to the “mere
existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against
discrimination” and the fact that the plaintiff did not complain
24
EEOC, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676,
74,677 (Nov. 10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11).
25
Id. at 74,676.
26
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). The Court quoted
the Eleventh Circuit case Henson v. Dundee to explain why this type of harassment
constitutes discrimination:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment formembers
of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace
that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or
woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed
to work andmake a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest
of racial epithets.
Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
27
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
28
Id. at 72. The Court pointed lower courts to the Restatement (Second) of
Agency sections 219 to 237, which concerns when a master or employer is liable for torts
committed by its servant or employee. See id; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY §§ 219–
37 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
29
See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
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using the procedure.
30
However, the Court suggested that the
employer might have a stronger argument “if its procedures were
better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come
forward.”
31
Over the next twelve years, lower courts struggled to
apply “agency principles” to determine employer liability,
reaching “wildly inconsistent results.”
32
B. The Supreme Court Establishes the Faragher/Ellerth
Defense
In 1998, the Supreme Court revisited the question of
vicarious employer liability under Title VII in two cases decided
on the same day, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
33
and Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.
34
While the Court announced a new rule
for employer liability jointly in Faragher and Ellerth, the facts of
the two cases took place in very different workplaces.
Beth Ann Faragher worked at a city beach as a part-time
ocean lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton in Florida.
35
While
working together in the close quarters of the Marine Safety
Section, Faragher’s twomale supervisors repeatedly touched her
and the other female lifeguards without their consent and made
lewd and offensive comments about the female lifeguards and
other women.
36
While the City of Boca Raton had a sexual
harassment policy, it “completely failed to disseminate [it]” to
employees in the Marine Safety Section.
37
Faragher did not
report her supervisors’ conduct to higher management.
38
By contrast, Kimberly Ellerth worked in an office, as a
salesperson for Burlington Industries, a large companywith twenty-
two thousand employees in fifty locations around the United
States.
39
Ellerth’s supervisor, a midlevel manager, made repeated
sexualized comments about her body and clothing and touched her
30
Id.
31
Id. at 73.
32
Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 678 (2000) [hereinafter The First Bite Is Free].
33
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
34
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
35
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
36
Id. For example, one supervisor repeatedly touched Faragher’s buttocks, and
during an interview with a woman applying to be a lifeguard, told her that the female
lifeguards had sex with the male lifeguards and asked her if she would do the same.
Another supervisor pantomimed an act of oral sex, frequently made vulgar remarks, and
told female lifeguards he wanted to have sex with them. Id. at 782.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747.
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without her consent.
40
Burlington Industries had a policy against
sexual harassment, which Ellerth knew about.
41
Like Faragher,
Ellerth did not report her harassment to management through her
employer’s internal complaint procedure.
42
In Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme Court established a
new scheme for determining employer liability for the acts of
supervisors in hostile work environment cases.
43
When the
supervisor takes a tangible employment action against the
employee—including hiring, firing, or failing to promote the
employee—the employer is vicariously liable for the supervisor’s
conduct.
44
However, when a supervisor creates a hostile work
environment but does not take a tangible employment action, the
employer is vicariously liable but may raise an affirmative
defense.
45
This defense has two prongs: (1) “that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior,” and (2) “that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise.”
46
Immediately following this articulation of the defense, the
Court gave some guidance as to what evidence could be shown to
satisfy each of its elements, suggesting that proof that the employer
“had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint
procedure” would often meet the first prong of the defense.
47
With
regard to the second prong, the Court explicitly addressed an
employee’s failure to report harassment and said that proof of an
“unreasonable failure” to use the employer’s complaint procedure
would “normally suffice” to meet this prong.
48
InFaragher, the Court reasoned that providing this defense
serves the “primary objective” of Title VII, which is “not to provide
redress but to avoid harm.”
49
The idea is to give “credit here to
40
Id. at 748. For example, the supervisor told Ellerth, “I don’t have time for
you right now, Kim . . . unless you want to tell me what you’re wearing,” and said, “are
you wearing shorter skirts yet, Kim, because it would make your job a whole heck of a
lot easier.” Id.
41
Id. at 748.
42
Id. at 748–49.
43
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
44
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761–62. A tangible employment action is an action that
causes a significant change in employment status. Questions and Answers for Small
Employers on Employment Liability for Harassment by Supervisors, U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Apr. 1, 2010), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/harassment-facts.html [https://perma.cc/YW2A-M9AJ].
45
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
46
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
47
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
48
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08.
49
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (citation omitted).
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employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty” to
prevent sexual harassment from occurring in the first place.
50
In
Ellerth, the Court noted that “Title VII is designed to encourage the
creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance
mechanisms,” and that making employer liability partially hinge
on such mechanisms “would effect Congress’s intention to promote
conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context.”
51
Therefore, the first prong of the defense is meant to incentivize
employers to develop and promulgate policies and procedures that
will prevent sexual harassment from occurring in their workplaces
and to promptly eliminate it if it does.
52
The second prong of the defense is meant to recognize the
duty of victims to avoid or mitigate harm and to encourage
victims to report harassment.
53
The Court explained that
An employer may, for example, have provided a proven, effective
mechanism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual
harassment, available to the employee without undue risk or expense.
If the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of the employer’s
preventive or remedial apparatus, she should not recover damages
that could have been avoided if she had done so.
54
This prong is also intended to allow employers to quash
harassment before it becomes “severe or pervasive” by encouraging
employees to report their harassment before it becomes bad enough
to be legally actionable, serving Title VII’s “deterrent purpose.”
55
After establishing this new framework, in Ellerth, the
Court affirmed the opinion of the Court of Appeals and reversed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Burlington
Industries.
56
The Court held that Burlington Industries was
vicariously liable, but remanded the case to allow Burlington
Industries the opportunity to assert the newly established
defense.
57
In Faragher, the Court found for Faragher outright
because the record made clear that the City of Boca Raton could
not prove the defense.
58
While the plaintiffs prevailed in each
50
Id. at 806.
51
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
52
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805.
53
See id. at 806.
54
Id. at 806–07.
55
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
56
Id. at 766.
57
Id.
58
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (holding that the City of Boca Raton could not be
found to have exercised reasonable care to prevent the supervisors’ harassing conduct
because it failed to disseminate its antiharassment policy and made no attempt to
oversee the conduct of the harassers).
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case, lower courts quickly interpreted the Faragher/Ellerth
defense to overwhelmingly benefit defendant-employers.
C. The Development of the Faragher/Ellerth Defense in
Subsequent Case Law
In Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme Court ostensibly
held that employers are vicariously liable for hostile work
environments created by supervisors, subject to the affirmative
defense discussed above. But this apparent victory for victims has
not been realized in subsequent cases, in which victims who
delayed in making official complaints were denied a remedy.
59
Although the Court purportedly created a standard holding
employers vicariously liable, “as a practical matter, the employers
won.”
60
The defense has morphed in ways that strongly favor
employers, with the result that employers are easily able to escape
vicarious liability for sexual harassment at the expense of victims.
61
Courts regularly find that an employer’s showing that it has
an official policy against sexual harassment that was distributed
to employees is enough to meet the first prong of the defense.
62
Though it is not always dispositive,
63
courts consider distribution of
an antiharassment policy “‘compelling proof’ that the company
exercised reasonable care in preventing and promptly correcting
sexual harassment.”
64
For example, in Shaw v. Autozone, Inc., an
early and influential case, the Seventh Circuit held that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment
when it had distributed to employees an anti-sexual harassment
policy containing multiple mechanisms for reporting complaints,
even when the employee testified that she had never seen this
policy.
65
As this case shows, so long as an employer can prove that
it has distributed a written policy to its employees, the question of
whether any given employee was actually aware of what the policy
contained is irrelevant. For example, in Helm v. Kansas, the
employee argued that her employer, the State of Kansas, had not
59
See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1055, 1063 (10th
Cir. 2009); Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1307 (11th Cir. 2007);
Shaw v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 812–13 (7th Cir. 1999).
60
The First Bite Is Free, supra note 32, at 703.
61
Id. at 708–15.
62
See, e.g., Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1288 (10th Cir. 2011); Shaw, 180
F.3d at 811–12; Phillips v. Taco Bell, 156 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 1998).
63
SeeWeger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2007).
64
Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 1998)).
65
Shaw, 180 F.3d at 811–12.
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sufficiently disseminated its sexual harassment policy.
66
The policy
appeared in the middle of a fifty-page employee handbook, and
although the employee had signed a form acknowledging that she
had read and understood the handbook, she was completely
unaware of the policy, as were numerous other employees.
67
The
employer did not provide training on the policy to non-
management employees.
68
Nonetheless, the court held that the
employee had constructive knowledge of the policy because she had
signed the acknowledgment form, so the employer’s dissemination
of the policy in this waywas sufficient to show that it had exercised
reasonable care to prevent harassment.
69
While courts do examine employers’ sexual harassment
policies to some extent, this evaluation tends to be limited to the
contents of the written document. Courts typically require a
policy to include: “(i) a description of prohibited conduct; (ii) a
list of individuals to whom complaints should be made, with a
bypass procedure to ensure that no victim will have to complain
to her harasser; and (iii) a grievance procedure calculated to
bring out complaints.”
70
Courts recognize a range of different
policies that meet these parameters.
71
Notably, the effectiveness of an employer’s written policy
at preventing harassment is generally not part of the analysis.
72
For instance, in Weger v. City of Ladue, the plaintiff-employee
argued that the employer’s policy was ineffective because the
employee’s coworkers observed the employee’s harassment by her
supervisor but did not report it, the employer did not offer sexual
harassment training, and the employer did not attempt to
monitor the supervisor’s behavior.
73
Sidestepping the question of
effectiveness, the court held that because the employer’s policy
“identifie[d] multiple officials to whom harassment may be
reported and contain[ed] an antiretaliation provision,” it was
66
Helm, 656 F.3d at 1288. The employee was an administrative assistant who
was touched on her rear end, legs, and breasts; forcibly kissed; and manually vaginally
penetrated by her supervisor, a state court judge. Id. at 1280.
67
Id. at 1288.
68
Id. at 1289.
69
Id. at 1289–90.
70
Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of
Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 11 (2003)
[hereinafter The Culture of Compliance] (footnotes omitted).
71
Id. at 11.
72
But see Reed v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d
1055, 1068 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (finding it to be a jury question whether an existing policy
“was being implemented and, if so, whether it was a reasonable and effective means of
meeting the employer’s duty to prevent and to correct sexual harassment”).
73
Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 720 (8th Cir. 2007).
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“facially valid,” and “as a matter of law,” showed that the
employer acted reasonably to prevent harassment.
74
When an employer has a facially valid policy, but the
employee has not complained via the policy’s complaint
procedure, courts routinely find the second prong of the
Faragher/Ellerth defense to be met because this constitutes an
unreasonable failure to take advantage of an opportunity to
correct the harassment.
75
In Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme
Court explained that proof that an employee unreasonably failed
to complain through the employer’s complaint procedure would
“normally suffice” to satisfy this prong of the defense.
76
In
subsequent cases, courts have regularly found that the employee
acted unreasonably even when the employee did make a
complaint through the employer’s procedure, but delayed in doing
so.
77
Additionally, courts have declared to be “unreasonable” the
very reasons that many women do not report harassment,
including a “generalized fear of retaliation”
78
or a feeling that
“reports would have fallen on deaf ears.”
79
Even a short delay inmaking a formal complaint can create
a barrier to justice for a victim of harassment, as illustrated by an
Eleventh Circuit case, Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Alabama.
80
Judge Ed Carnes, recounting the facts of the case,
repeatedly emphasized that Baldwin “never complained” about her
supervisor’s sexually explicit comments and sexual misconduct,
which included propositioning her while on a business trip, and, on
another occasion, calling her into his office, closing the door, coming
up close behind her, and saying, “Hey, Babe, blow me.”
81
Judge
Carnes held that the second prong of the Faragher/Ellerth defense
was met because, while the employee “finally complained” to the
Human Resources Department,
82
she did so three months and two
weeks after her supervisor’s first proposition.
83
Calling this
“anything but prompt, early, or soon,” Judge Carnes concluded that
74
Id.
75
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
76
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
77
See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th Cir. 2009).
78
Id.
79
Crawford v. BNSF Ry. Co., 665 F.3d 978, 985 (8th Cir. 2012).
80
SeeBaldwinv.BlueCross/BlueShield ofAla., 480F.3d1287, 1307 (11thCir. 2007).
81
Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1292, 1294. Judge Carnes noted the employee’s failure
to complain five times: “she never complained about it;” “[s]he did not, however, complain
to anyone about it, at least not then;” “she did not report the conversation or her fears to
any higher-up or to anyone in the Human Resources Department;” “she did not file a
complaint with anyone in the company;” “[s]he made no attempt, however, to report
anything to Employee Relations.” Id. at 1293–95.
82
Id. at 1297.
83
Id. at 1307.
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she “waited too long to complain.”
84
The employee testified that she
had delayed reporting because she feared losing her job and that
she wanted to “just go along to get along.”
85
Judge Carnes
dismissed this reason as invalid because any harassed employee
could say that she did not report out of fear of being fired and drew
on precedent to explain that “the problem of workplace
discrimination . . . cannot be [corrected] without the cooperation of
the victims.”
86
Similarly, in Pinkerton v. Colorado Department of
Transportation, the court placed the burden of preventing and
remedying sexual harassment on the victims of sexual harassment.
87
In this case, the employee worked as an administrative assistant for
the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT).
88
Her
immediate supervisor made what Judge Paul Kelly, writing for the
Tenth Circuit, characterized as “inappropriate, sexually oriented
remarks,” including asking her about her breast size, whether she
had sexual urges, and if she masturbated.
89
After enduring these
comments for two and a half months, Pinkerton reported them to
CDOT’s internal civil rights administrator, and shortly thereafter,
she filed a written complaint.
90
Judge Kelly held that this
“unexplained” delay was unreasonable, because the employee knew
of CDOT’s antiharassment policy and did not take the opportunity
to report her harassment sooner.
91
Like in Baldwin, the employee
said that she did not complain sooner because she feared retaliation
from her supervisor.
92
Judge Kelly rejected this reason, saying that
because the objective of Title VII is to avoid harm, the employee has
a duty to promptly report her harassment so that the employer can
correct it.
93
Even if the employee fears retaliation, “a generalized fear
of retaliation simply is not sufficient to explain a long delay in
reporting sexual harassment.”
94
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc.,
347 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003)). Judge Carnes further found the employee’s response
to the employer’s remedy unreasonable because, following investigation of her sexual
harassment claim, she “refused to cooperate” with the employer’s proposed remedies:
undergoing joint counseling with her harasser (while continuing to work with him), or the
employee being transferred to work in another city. Id. at 1305–06, 1308.
87
See Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th Cir. 2009).
88
Id. at 1055.
89
Id. at 1057.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1063–64.
92
See id. at 1063; Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287,
1307 (11th Cir. 2007).
93
Pinkerton, 563 F.3d at 1063–64.
94
Id. at 1063 (emphasis added). However, courts do find a delay or failure to
report to be “reasonable” when the employee testifies to specific facts leading him or her
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In dissent, Judge David Ebel argued that a jury could find
that the employee’s delay in complaining was not unreasonable,
and suggested a list of factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the employee’s behavior, including the length
of the delay; the precise nature of the harassment especially in
the initial stages; the accessibility and effectiveness of the
complaint procedure; and any other efforts the employee took to
attempt to stop the harassment or prevent it from worsening.
95
Not surprisingly, when a mere few months’ delay in
reporting is deemed unreasonable, courts do not hesitate to
conclude that an employee’s behavior was unreasonable when she
did not report the harassment to her employer at all. For example,
in Jones v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,
the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the employer, holding that because the employee
experienced sexual harassment for ten years and did not report
it, the second prong of the defense was met and “no reasonable
jury could hold [the employer] liable for such harassment.”
96
Thus, while purporting to hold employers vicariously
liable for supervisor-created hostile work environments, the
Faragher/Ellerth defense makes it very easy for employers to
dodge liability in the extremely common situation in which the
victim does not promptly report his or her harassment.
97
A recent
Third Circuit case, Minarsky v. Susquehanna County,
98
demonstrates how this interpretation of the defense creates
barriers to justice for victims of harassment. It also points the
way forward for courts to course correct and provide redress to
victims who have remained silent.
to believe that retaliation might occur. See, e.g., Still v. Cummins Power Sys., No. 07-
5235, 2009 WL 57021, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2009) (finding employee’s failure to use
employer’s internal complaint procedure potentially reasonable in racially based hostile
work environment case when two other employees had been retaliated against after
lodging complaints against the same supervisor).
95
Pinkerton, 563 F.3d at 1068 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
96
Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 329 (3d Cir. 2015); see also,
e.g., Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d 1167, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
employee who did not complain about her harasser’s behavior to company’s management
or human resources had “unreasonably failed to take advantage of [the company’s]
preventative and corrective opportunities.”).
97
According to a report from the EEOC, approximately seventy percent of
employees who suffer workplace harassment never speak with a supervisor or manager
about it. FELDBLUM& LIPNIC, supra note 15, at 16.
98
Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2013).
616 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:2
II. MINARSKY V. SUSQUEHANNA COUNTYHIGHLIGHTS THE
FLAWS OF THE FARAGHER/ELLERTHDEFENSE
Responding directly to the #MeToo movement, inMinarsky
v. Susquehanna County the Third Circuit recognized problems
with both prongs of the Faragher/Ellerth defense. Writing for the
majority, Judge Margaret Rendell raised the bar for what an
employer must show to meet the first prong of the defense and
recognized that a victimwho does not complain is not always acting
unreasonably. Minarsky represents a significant departure from
prior case law and shows how courts can reinterpret the
Faragher/Ellerth defense to better align with the realities of
workplace harassment and provide a remedy to its victims.
Sheri Minarsky began work as an administrative
assistant at the Susquehanna County Department of Veterans
Affairs in September 2009.
99
On her first day of work, she signed
Susquehanna County’s General Harassment Policy, which
prohibited harassment based upon sex and directed employees to
report such harassment to their supervisor, or, if the supervisor
was the harasser, to the Chief County Clerk or a County
Commissioner.
100
One day per week, Minarsky worked closely
with her supervisor, Thomas Yadlosky, the director of the
department.
101
Minarsky testified that soon after she began
working with Yadlosky, he started to sexually harass her, mostly
in the form of unwanted sexual touching.
102
Yadlosky massaged
her shoulders, hugged her from behind, “pull[ed] [her] against
him,” and attempted to kiss her.
103
Since the two worked in an
area separate from the other employees, Yadlosky’s behavior was
largely unobserved by others.
104
Yadlosky also used his work
email address to send Minarsky sexually explicit emails and
called her at home on her days off to ask personal questions.
105
Yadlosky harassed Minarsky over a period of nearly four
years.
106
Toward the beginning of her employment, Minarsky
asked Yadlosky to stop, to no avail.
107
Minarsky did not follow
the complaint procedure detailed in the General Harassment
Policy and report Yadlosky’s harassment to the Chief County
99
Id. at 306.
100
Id. at 308.
101
Id. at 306.
102
Id.
103
Id. (second alteration in original).
104
Id.
105
Id. at 307.
106
Id. at 308. The harassment began shortly after Minarsky started her
employment in September 2009 and continued until July 2013. Id. at 306, 308.
107
Id. at 307.
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Clerk or any of the County Commissioners for several reasons.
108
She feared retaliation from Yadlosky himself, because when she
had voiced disagreement with him in the past, he had become
“nasty.”
109
She did not trust the County Commissioners because
Yadlosky had repeatedly told her that she was at risk of being
fired by them.
110
She feared losing her job, which she needed to
keep so that she could pay the medical bills for her young
daughter’s cancer treatment.
111
Moreover, she knew that
Yadlosky had previously been reprimanded for inappropriate
behavior toward another woman, yet the reprimand had not
changed his behavior, and she worried that her complaint
against him would likewise be ineffective.
112
By April 2013, the emotional toll of Yadlosky’s harassment
had adversely affected Minarsky’s health and, following a
conversation with her physician, she emailed Yadlosky telling
him how uncomfortable his behavior made her.
113
Shortly
thereafter, she told a coworker about the harassment and, after
an investigation by the County, Yadlosky was terminated.
114
In
October 2014, Minarsky sued both Yadlosky and the County
under Title VII and Pennsylvania law.
115
When the case reached the Third Circuit, Judge Rendell,
in an opinion filed on July 3, 2018, vacated and remanded the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the County, finding
that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether both
elements of the Faragher/Ellerth defense had been met.
116
Judge
Rendell acknowledged the #MeToo movement in a footnote,
noting that “[t]his appeal comes to us in the midst of national
news regarding a veritable firestorm of allegations of rampant
sexual misconduct that has been closeted for years, not reported
by the victims,” and drawing out the #MeToo movement’s
relevance to the Faragher/Ellerth defense.
117
With regard to the first prong of the Faragher/Ellerth
defense, “that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
108
Id. at 308.
109
Id. at 307.
110
Id. at 308.
111
Id. at 307.
112
Id. at 307–08.
113
Id. at 308.
114
Id. at 308–09.
115
See Complaint, Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, No. 3:14-cv-2021 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 21, 2014). Minarsky’s claims against Yadlosky were eventually withdrawn or
dismissed. See Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 309.
116
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 303, 306. On remand, the case settled prior to trial. Order
at 1, Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, No. 3:14-cv-2021 (M.D. Pa. dismissed Jan. 16, 2019).
117
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 313 n.12.
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and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,”
118
Judge
Rendell stressed that although the County had a written
antiharassment policy, which Minarsky had signed, County
officials were also aware that Yadlosky demonstrated a “pattern
of inappropriate physical contact,” including having attempted to
hug or kiss the County Commissioner herself approximately ten
times.
119
And although “County officials were faced with
indicators that Yadlosky’s behavior formed a pattern of conduct,
as opposed to mere stray incidents, . . . they seemingly turned a
blind eye.”
120
Judge Rendell questioned whether the County’s
antiharassment policy was really effective, wondering if, since the
County had notice of Yadlosky’s pattern of unwanted advances
toward female employees, the County should have taken more
care to ensure that Minarsky was not being harassed.
121
Accordingly, Judge Rendell held that there was a genuine issue of
material fact such that the jury should have decided whether the
County had exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
Yadlosky’s harassment of Minarsky.
122
Judge Rendell’s emphasis on whether the County’s
antiharassment policy was generally effective, and particularly
effective for Sheri Minarsky, is a surprising departure from prior
case law, in which courts rubber-stamp “facially valid” policies
disseminated to employees without any examination into
whether they actually work.
123
Her treatment of the second
prong of the defense constitutes an even bigger and arguably
more important departure: contrary to the weight of prior case
law,
124
Judge Rendell emphasized that “a mere failure to report
one’s harassment is not per se unreasonable.”
125
Calling the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s actions in
workplace sexual harassment cases “a paradigmatic question for
the jury” because it is “highly circumstance-specific,” Judge
Rendell emphasized all of the reasons that a jury could find that
Minarsky did not act unreasonably.
126
She did not report because
of “her fear of Yadlosky’s hostility on a day-to-day basis and
retaliation by having her fired; her worry of being terminated by
the Chief Clerk; and the futility of reporting, since others knew
118
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
119
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 312.
120
Id. at 312–13.
121
Id. at 313.
122
Id.
123
See supra Section I.C.
124
See supra Section I.C.
125
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 314.
126
Id. at 313–14.
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of his conduct, yet it continued.”
127
She could not afford to lose
her job as she needed to continue paying for her daughter’s
cancer treatment.
128
In a lengthy discussion of the underlying
evidence that could lead a jury to conclude that Minarsky was
not unreasonable for failing to report, Judge Rendell also
pointed to the ways in which the harassment physically and
emotionally harmed Minarsky and may have contributed to her
hesitance to tell anyone about what was happening.
129
A jury
could find that Minarsky’s silence was not an “idle delay in
reporting,” but rather a reasonable reaction to “prolonged,
agonizing harassment.”
130
Judge Rendell addressed the #MeToo movement in a
footnote, noting that, in many cases, #MeToo victims coming
forward with stories of harassment by powerful men did not
report their harassment for years.
131
Citing news articles and the
EEOC’s 2016 Report of the Select Task Force on the Study of
Harassment in the Workplace showing that the failure to report
workplace harassment is widespread, Judge Rendell observed
that the policy behind the Faragher/Ellerth defense—which
faults an employee who does not report harassment in the name
of preventing future harassment—is out of step with how real
people react to harassment:
132
[T]here may be a certain fallacy that underlies the notion that
reporting sexual misconduct will end it. Victims do not always view it
this way. Instead, they anticipate negative consequences or fear that
the harassers will face no reprimand; thus, more often than not,
victims choose not to report the harassment.
133
Because a jury might be sympathetic to these reasons for not
reporting harassment, “a jury could conclude that the employee’s
non-reporting was understandable, perhaps even reasonable.”
134
The findings of the EEOC in the report cited inMinarsky
demonstrate that what most judges expect from sexual-
harassment victims does not align with how victims actually
127
Id. at 314.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 316–17.
130
Id. at 316.
131
Id. at 313 n.12.
132
Id. (citing FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 15, at v; ABC News/Washington
Post, Unwanted Sexual Harassment: Not Just a Hollywood Story (Oct. 17, 2017), https://
www.langerresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/1192a1SexualHarassment.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/X832-N2UQ]; Stefanie Johnson et al., Why We Fail to Report Sexual Harassment,
HARVARD BUS. REV. (Oct. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/why-we-fail-to-report-sexual-
harassment [https://perma.cc/7NLV-JP6L]).
133
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 313 n.12.
134
Id.
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react. This 2016 report by the co-chairs of the EEOC, following
an eighteen-month examination of workplace harassment by the
Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace,
surveyed studies of workplace harassment and concluded that
“[t]he least common response of either men or women to
harassment is to take some formal action—either to report the
harassment internally or file a formal legal complaint.”
135
In fact,
only six to thirteen percent of employees who experience
harassment file a formal complaint.
136
Common reasons that employees do not report
harassment are fear that they will not be believed, fear that the
employer will not do anything in response to their claim, and fear
of social and professional retaliation.
137
Additionally, employees
may not report because they experience natural psychological
responses to the harassment: shame, self-blame, and denial.
138
But courts regularly do not consider a fear of retaliation or
inaction to justify a delay or failure to report, even though these
are the very same reasons that the majority of employees do not
report harassment.
139
When courts label women who delay in
complaining or do not formally complain at all as unreasonable,
this “contradicts the available empirical evidence and imposes
expectations upon women that experience demonstrates few of
them will meet.”
140
As Minarsky recognizes, this signals that the
case law, which requires victims to respond in one narrowly
defined, unrealistic manner and denies them a remedy when they
do not, is seriously out of step with the reality of how victims
respond to harassment.
141
135
FELDBLUM& LIPNIC, supra note 15, at 16 (emphasis omitted).
136
Id.
137
Id.; see also Claire Cain Miller, It’s Not Just Fox: Why Women Don’t Report
Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/
upshot/its-not-just-fox-why-women-dont-report-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.
cc/V776-UJ43] (explaining that victims do not report sexual harassment because they
fear retaliation or “fear they will face disbelief, inaction, blame or societal and
professional retaliation”).
138
See Beverly Engel,Why Don’t Victims of Sexual Harassment Come Forward
Sooner?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/
the-compassion-chronicles/201711/why-dont-victims-sexual-harassment-come-forward-
sooner [https://perma.cc/BC2E-HFY5]; see also FELDBLUM&LIPNIC, supra note 15, at 15
(“Common workplace-based responses by those who experience sex-based harassment
are to . . . deny or downplay the gravity of the situation . . . .”).
139
See supra Section I.C.
140
L. Camille Hebert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual
Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 742 (2007). Hebert argues for a “reasonable woman” standard
for application of the second prong of the defense, requiring courts to acknowledge the “effect
gender has on the reasonableness of responses to being sexually harassed.” Id. at 743.
141
See The First Bite Is Free, supra note 32, at 728 (“Some of the unfairness
inflicted on victims by the affirmative defense could be solved if courts would take a more
contextualized approach to determining ‘reasonableness.’”).
2020] WHEN WOMEN’S SILENCE 621
Moreover, the Faragher/Ellerth defense rewards an
employer’s symbolic gestures rather than substantive efforts to
actually prevent harassment in that particular workplace.
142
While the Faragher/Ellerth defense was originally intended to
advance Title VII’s purpose of “encourage[ing] the creation of
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms,”
143
the question of whether the employer’s policies and procedures
are effective has dropped out of the analysis. Employers have
responded to the creation of the defense by disseminating
written policies against harassment to employees and then
pointing to these policies to escape liability when harassment
does occur.
144
However, studies suggest that antiharassment
policies and grievance procedures may not have much effect on
whether harassment will occur in that workplace.
145
Employers
have also responded by providing harassment and diversity
training, but according to the EEOC’s report of the Select Task
Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace, “[m]uch of
the training done over the last [thirty] years has not worked as
a prevention tool—it’s been too focused on simply avoiding legal
liability.”
146
As feminist legal scholar Susan Bisom-Rapp has
argued, this approach provides a “cosmetic rather than a
substantive solution.”
147
Therefore, the measures employers take
to show that they “exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct”
148
sexual harassment often do not actually prevent
harassment at all.
Indeed, as workplace equality scholar Joanna L. Grossman
points out, employers are disincentivized to “undertake any
employer measures that go beyond the minimum requirements if
those additional measures actually induce victims to complain”
because if the employee promptly complains, the Faragher/Ellerth
defense is no longer available to the employer.
149
The defense thus
creates perverse incentives for employers to take only the bare
142
See The Culture of Compliance, supra note 70, at 3 (arguing that the
Faragher/Ellerth defense allows employers to “insulate themselves from liability entirely
without making a dent in the underlying problem” by complying with judicially created
rules and adopting “cookie-cutter sexual harassment policies and procedures”).
143
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (emphasis added).
144
See supra Section I.C.
145
See, e.g., Vicki J.Magley&JoannaL.Grossman,DoSexualHarassmentTrainings
Really Work?, SCI. AM. (Nov. 10, 2017), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/do-
sexual-harassment-prevention-trainings-really-work/ [https://perma.cc/3JG5-Q2SE].
146
FELDBLUM& LIPNIC, supra note 15, at v.
147
Susan Bisom-Rapp, Sex Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for
Legal Incentives for Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
62, 62 (2018).
148
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
149
The Culture of Compliance, supra note 70, at 14.
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minimum steps to gesture at prevention in order to shield against
liability.
150
Employers are rewarded for “paying lip service” to
preventing harassment, and “[t]hus, the triumph of form over
substance in sexual harassment law occurs.”
151
III. CONGRESSMUST ACT TO ELIMINATE OR REFORM THE
FARAGHER/ELLERTHDEFENSE
The Faragher/Ellerth defense must be either eliminated
or reformed to provide more adequate relief to employee-victims.
WhileMinarsky points the way for courts to provide a remedy to
victims who have not complained by returning to the original
spirit and language of Faragher and Ellerth, reform through
modification of the doctrine may be slow to come in some circuits
and nonexistent in others. Therefore, to provide full and effective
relief nationwide, Congress must act to remove this barrier to
justice and provide victims of harassment, including those who
did not complain, with a remedy for the harm done to them.
152
First, this Part will propose legislation to eliminate the
Faragher/Ellerth defense and hold employers strictly liable when
supervisors create hostile work environments, following a model
provided by the New York City Human Rights Law. Second, this
Part will propose an alternative legislative reform of the defense
that raises the bar for the preventive efforts an employer is
required to show andmandates that courts make a contextualized
inquiry into the particular circumstances of the complaining
employee when considering whether she acted reasonably.
Congress should eliminate or reform the Faragher/Ellerth
defense under Title VII. State and local legislatures should also
independently enact these reforms so that the defense does not
apply, or does not apply in the same way, under state and local
antidiscrimination laws. While most state and local
antidiscrimination laws are coextensive with Title VII, such that
the Faragher/Ellerth defense will apply to claims under these
laws as well, state and local legislatures have the power to change
150
See Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual Harassment: The Federal Courts’
Wake-up Call for Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 461 (2002) (noting that courts have
interpreted the defense to reward only “minimal prevention efforts” by the employer).
151
The Culture of Compliance, supra note 70, at 4–5.
152
By allowing more victims to access remedies, both of these solutions advance
the compensatory goal of Title VII as stated in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody: “It
is . . . the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of
unlawful employment discrimination.” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418
(1975). Furthermore, the threat of being forced to pay damages (such as back pay) when
discrimination occurs will incentivize employers to eliminate discrimination in their
workplaces. Id. at 417–18.
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their laws to provide greater protections and more effective relief
to victims of harassment.
153
A. Strict Liability for Employers
Congress can better protect and compensate victims of
sexual harassment by eliminating the Faragher/Ellerth defense
and holding employers strictly liable for supervisor-created
hostile work environments, as is the case under the New York
City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).
154
NYCHRL section 8-
107(13) holds employers liable for “an unlawful discriminatory
practice based upon the conduct of an employee or agent . . . [who]
exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility.”
155
This
section was enacted in 1991 as part of the sweeping reform of the
NYCHRL meant to strengthen its antidiscrimination
protections.
156
Section 8-107(13) was intended to “provide an
incentive to establish a policy against discrimination, [and] hold
employers to a high level of liability for employment
discrimination.”
157
In Zakrzewska v. New School, the New York
Court of Appeals held that the Faragher/Ellerth defense is not
available under the NYCHRL.
158
This case provides a powerful
example of how imposing strict liability on employers for
harassment by supervisors is more fair to victims of harassment
than is the Faragher/Ellerth defense.
153
For example, New York state recently adopted legislation eliminating the
availability of the Faragher/Ellerth defense under the New York State Human Rights
Law and instead providing that “[t]he fact that such individual did not make a complaint
about the harassment to such employer, licensing agency, employment agency or labor
organization shall not be determinative of whether such employer, licensing agency,
employment agency or labor organization shall be liable.” N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(h).
154
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(b). California and Illinois have also eliminated
the Faragher/Ellerth defense and hold employers strictly liable. See State Dept. of Health
Servs. v. Superior Court of Sacramento, 79 P.3d 556, 562 (Cal. 2003) (holding that employers
are strictly liable for sexual harassment by supervisors under California’s Fair Employment
and Housing Act); Sangamon Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Ill. Human Rights Comm’n, 908 N.E.2d
39, 45 (Ill. 2009) (holding that employers are strictly liable for sexual harassment by
supervisors under the Illinois Human Rights Act).
155
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(b).
156
N.Y.C. COUNCIL, COMM. ON GEN. WELFARE, REPORT ON PROPOSED INT. NO.
465-A AND PROPOSED INT. NO. 536-A, at 1–3 (1991), http://www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/
default/files/all/LL39CommitteeReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTS6-SUXK].
157
Id. at 6. Although the 1991 Amendments were meant to provide greater
protection than was available under state and federal laws, courts regularly interpreted
NYCHRL provisions to be coextensive with federal laws, and the New York City Council
passed the Restoration Act in 2005 to underscore that the NYCHRL should be construed
independently from state and federal law. Craig Gurain, A Return to Eyes on the Prize:
Litigating Under the Restored New York City Human Rights Law, 33 FORDHAMURB. L.J.
255, 277 nn.101–02 (2006); see N.Y.C. LOCAL LAWNO. 85 OF 2005.
158
Zakrzewska v. New Sch. (Zakrzewska II), 928 N.E.2d 1035, 1036 (N.Y. 2010).
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Plaintiff Domenika Zakrzewska was a student at The New
School who worked part-time in the School’s Print Output Center
and was subjected to “sexually harassing emails and conduct” by
her supervisor.
159
Zakrzewska brought suit in federal court in the
Southern District of New York, asserting claims of sexual
harassment and retaliation under the NYCHRL.
160
District Judge
Lewis Kaplan found The New School entitled to the
Faragher/Ellerth defense: it had disseminated its anti-sexual
harassment policy, and Zakrzewska did not make a formal
complaint until two years after the harassment began, which the
judge called “a very lengthy period of silence.”
161
Moreover, when
she was dissatisfied with The New School’s subsequent
investigation, she “deliberately decided not to” take the next step
in The New School’s procedure.
162
However, Judge Kaplan
questioned whether the Faragher/Ellerth defense was available
under the NYCHRL, noting that while state and local anti-
discrimination laws are generally considered to be coextensive
with Title VII, “the plain language of [the NYCHRL] is
inconsistent with the defense crafted by the Supreme Court in
Faragher and Ellerth.”
163
Judge Kaplan declined to grant
summary judgment to The New School and certified the question
of whether the Faragher/Ellerth defense applies under the
NYCHRL to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
164
The
Second Circuit in turn certified this question to the New York
Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court, to make a definitive
determination on this significant issue of New York law.
165
The New York Court of Appeals agreed with Judge
Kaplan that under the plain, unambiguous language of the
NYCHRL, The New School could not use the Faragher/Ellerth
defense to escape liability.
166
Zakrzewska had alleged that the
harasser was her immediate supervisor, and section 8-107(13)(b)
imposes liability on an employer when the harasser “exercised
managerial or supervisory responsibility.”
167
Moreover, under
section 8-107(13)(e), an employer’s antidiscrimination policies
and procedures serve to limit the damages recoverable by the
159
Id.
160
Zakrzewska v. New Sch. (Zakrzewska I), 598 F. Supp. 2d 426, 429, 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). Zakrzewska was domiciled in Florida, giving federal court diversity
jurisdiction over the case. See Amended Complaint at 1–2, Zakrzewska v. New Sch., No.
06 Civ. 5463 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2006).
161
Zakrzewska I, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 433–45.
162
Id. at 433–34.
163
Id. at 435.
164
Id. at 437–38.
165
Zakrzewska v. New Sch., 574 F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 2009).
166
Zakrzewska II, 928 N.E.2d at 1039.
167
Zakrzewska II, 928 N.E.2d at 1036; N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(b).
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employee, rather than work as a total shield against liability.
168
Therefore, this legislative scheme of section 8-107(13) was
inconsistent with the Faragher/Ellerth defense.
169
The court also
looked to the legislative history, concluding that the New York
City Council intended section 8-107(13)(b) to impose strict
liability for employers in cases of workplace discrimination.
170
After Zakrzewska,
171
New York courts find employers
liable for supervisor-created hostile work environments under
the NYCHRL even when the Faragher/Ellerth defense applies
to the employee’s claims under Title VII.
172
Strict liability thus
grants a remedy to victims of harassment who would not have
one under Title VII. Because the Faragher/Ellerth defense
leaves plaintiffs who suffer legally actionable harassment
without any remedy, it is “inherently unfair.”
173
A rule holding
employers strictly liable for harassment created by supervisors,
managers, and even coworkers, locates responsibility for
preventing harassment in the appropriate place. The employer
has control over the workplace and has the power to create a
culture and implement policies and procedures that prevent
harassment and discrimination. The onus should be on the
employer to create a harassment-free workplace and be held
legally responsible if it fails to do so. If the goal of Title VII is to
“avoid harm”
174
—to prevent discrimination from occurring—this
will be more appropriately and effectively accomplished by
allocating the burden for preventing harassment to the
employer, not to the employee.
Some may question whether the loss of the
Faragher/Ellerth defense will cause employers to cease adopting
antiharassment policies and procedures. However, rather than
creating the perverse incentives discussed in Part II, holding
employers strictly liable would incentivize them to implement
policies and procedures that truly do prevent sexual harassment.
168
Zakrzewska II, 928 N.E.2d at 1039; see N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(3).
169
Zakrzewska II, 928 N.E.2d at 1039.
170
Id.
171
Zakrzewska eventually settled her case with The New School. See Order,
Zakrzewska v. New Sch., 06 Civ. 5463 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2011).
172
See, e.g., Philip v. Gtech Corp., No. 14 Civ. 9261, 2016 WL 3959729, at *27
(S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2016) (allowing plaintiff’s NYCHRL claim for a racial hostile work
environment to proceed even if Faragher/Ellerth defense could apply to plaintiff’s state
and federal claims); Edrisse v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 381, 388–89 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (allowing employee’s NYCHRL claim to proceed but granting summary judgment
to employer on Title VII claim because it had satisfied the Faragher/Ellerth defense by
having an antiharassment policy and multiple avenues by which employees could report
harassment, and employee had not “pursue[d] these opportunities.”).
173
The First Bite Is Free, supra note 32, at 735.
174
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
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Employers who face liability for monetary damages whenever
sexual harassment occurs in their workplaces will be motivated to
do everything possible to prevent it from happening to protect their
bottom line.
175
As Susan Bisom-Rapp argues, “[g]reater potential
exposure to liability may spur employers to make changes not only
to training but to transforming workplace culture.”
176
Moreover, employer efforts to prevent harassment can be
further rewarded if employers are permitted to show evidence of
“good-faith efforts to prevent discrimination” to reduce their
exposure to damages,
177
as available under the NYCHRL.
178
Employers would still be incentivized to develop and implement
harassment-preventing policies and procedures as a way to limit
their damages, rather than as a total shield against liability.
179
If an employer, in good faith, takes substantial measures to
prevent harassment in its workplace, but harassment by a
supervisor still occurs, the extent of the employer’s preventive
efforts can be considered as part of the damages calculation.
Imposing strict liability on employers for hostile work
environments created by supervisors will motivate employers to
combat harassment and “reward them only if their actionswork.”
180
If an employer’s efforts to prevent sexual harassment succeed,
harassment will not occur and the employer will not be exposed to
liability. Strict liability thus incentivizes substantive, successful
prevention of sexual harassment. If employer efforts are not
successful, however, victim-employees are still afforded a remedy.
B. Legislative Reform of the Faragher/Ellerth Defense
An alternative solution to imposing a strict-liability rule
is legislation that retains the defense but reforms it to hold
employers to a higher standard in preventing harassment and
to more accurately reflect how real victims reasonably respond
to harassment. Congress or state and local legislatures can
reform the defense by requiring a list of factors to be considered
by judges in its application.
175
See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1332 (1989) (“The most efficient method of discouraging sexual
harassment may be by creating incentives for the employer to police the conduct of its
supervisory employees, and this is done by making the employer liable.”).
176
Bisom-Rapp, supra note 147, at 74.
177
Id.
178
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(d)–(e) (allowing an employer to mitigate
penalties or damages by showing it had “[e]stablished and complied with policies, programs
and procedures for the prevention and detection of unlawful discriminatory practices”
including an antiharassment policy, investigations procedures, or antiharassment trainings).
179
The First Bite Is Free, supra note 32, at 735–36.
180
The Culture of Compliance, supra note 70, at 71.
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This legislation should mandate that employers wishing
to invoke the defense have the burden of showing that their
efforts to prevent and correct sexually harassing behavior are
effective. Employers must show that their policies are not
merely symbolic attempts to avoid liability, but part of a sincere,
holistic, and substantive effort to eradicate harassment.
Courts should be required to consider the following factors
when evaluating the first prong of the defense: the existence of an
antiharassment policy detailing a multifaceted complaint
procedure, and the dissemination of this policy such that
employees have actual notice of their rights; the existence of
sexual harassment trainings or other educational efforts of types
which independent research has found to be effective;
181
the
extent to which the employer’s leadership and management
actively promote a respectful, harassment-free workplace;
182
the
particular circumstances in which the harassment occurred, and
the extent to which the employer took adequate steps to prevent
harassment in that employee’s particular case;
183
the occurrence
of other incidents of harassment both in that particular workplace
and across the employer’s locations; and the employer’s response
to past complaints of harassment.
184
Judges and juries will be able
to make a better determination of whether an employer took
reasonable care to prevent harassment by considering this broad
range of factors rather than simply facing the narrow question of
whether the employer had an antiharassment policy with a
complaint procedure of which the employee had constructive
notice. Raising the bar for this prong of the defense would
181
According to the EEOC, “[m]uch of the training done over the last [thirty]
years has not worked as a prevention tool.” FELDBLUM&LIPNIC, supra note 15, at v. More
research is needed to show what types of trainings effectively prevent harassment. See id.
at 49. Therefore, at this time, it will be difficult for employers to show that their trainings
are effective. If future research indicates that certain types of trainings are effective at
reducing or preventing harassment, employers may have an easier time showing this—
moreover, employers who adopt these types of trainings will actually prevent harassment
from occurring in the first place. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 147, at 74 (“If training is an
ineffective prophylactic, why should it be legally relevant?”).
182
The EEOC’s Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace
found that workplace culture is crucial in preventing harassment. FELDBLUM & LIPNIC,
supra note 15, at 31. Workplace culture inhospitable to harassment requires (1) senior
leadership commitment to a “diverse, inclusive, and respectful workplace in which
harassment is simply not acceptable”; and (2) systems to hold employees at all levels
accountable for creating this kind of workplace. Id. Less harassment occurs in workplaces
in which senior leaders take a holistic approach to preventing harassment. Id. at 31, 36.
183
For example, in Minarsky, the employee and her supervisor worked in an
isolated area. Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 2018).
Employers should take extra steps to protect employees who work alone with one other
employee. Another scenario in which a female employee might be particularly at risk is
when she works in a male-dominated industry or workplace. Again, employers should take
extra preventive measures in these cases.
184
SeeWest, supra note 150, at 497.
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incentivize employers to actually work to prevent harassment, as
merely having an antiharassment policy on the books would no
longer be enough to shield them from liability.
Regarding the second prong of the defense, legislation
should mandate that, following Minarsky, “a mere failure to
report one’s harassment is not per se unreasonable.”
185
Legislation should instruct courts to consider the reasons a
victim did not report harassment, or delayed in doing so, and
evaluate whether those reasons were genuinely held. The
following reasons for not reporting harassment, if genuinely
held, should not be considered unreasonable for the purposes of
application of the defense: fear of retaliation, fear of not being
believed, fear that that the employer will take no action, or the
victim’s feeling of shame, self-blame, or denial. Judges and juries
should also consider the psychological impact the harassment
had on the victim that may have contributed to a reluctance to
report.
186
A legal judgment of whether the plaintiff’s behavior
was “reasonable” should track with how victims really respond
to harassment, and not prevent a plaintiff from accessing a
remedy simply because she responded to being harassed in an
extremely common and understandable way.
In addition to examining the reason for the failure or
delay in reporting, judges and juries should also be required to
consider the nature of the harassment itself, paying particular
attention to the early stages of that harassment.
187
If the
harassment began at a low level and rose to a legally actionable
level over time, it is not realistic or fair to require victims to
immediately report the first instance. It is also important that
judges and juries consider any steps, other than filing an official
complaint, that the employee took to attempt to stop the
harassment.
188
The second prong of the defense requires the
employee to reasonably “take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise.”
189
Victims often respond to harassment by
avoiding the harasser, and this response should be considered
an effort to avoid harm. Confronting the harasser, saying no to
the harasser, or telling the harasser to stop the offensive
185
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 314.
186
See Engel, supra note 138 (explaining that some victims respond to
harassment by developing feelings of low self-esteem, hopelessness, and helplessness,
making them less likely to seek help).
187
See Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1068 (10th Cir. 2009)
(J. Ebel, dissenting).
188
See id.
189
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (emphasis
added); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (emphasis added).
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behavior are also efforts to avoid further harm that must be
considered when evaluating the second prong of the defense.
Legislation as described above would not only serve to
compensate more sexual harassment victims. Requiring
employers to do more to combat harassment in their workplaces
would reduce the harassment that occurs there. This is an
important step toward eradicating sexual harassment and
discrimination in the workplace.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of the #MeToo movement, we are at a moment
of great cultural shift regarding attitudes toward sexual
harassment.
190
As momentum toward combating workplace
harassment peaks, reform of the Faragher/Ellerth defense is
urgent. Employers should no longer be permitted to evade
liability for legally actionable hostile work environments created
by their own supervisors in workplaces over which they had
complete control. The onus should be on the employers, not the
victims of harassment, to prevent harassment in the workplace.
The Faragher/Ellerth defense should either be eliminated to hold
employers strictly liable for supervisor-created hostile work
environments, or reformed to require employers to show that they
have truly engaged in preventive efforts and jettison the mandate
that the employee-victim promptly respond to harassment in
particular, employer-dictated ways. Both reforms have two
positive outcomes. First, they would incentivize employers to
actually do the work necessary to eradicate harassment in the
workplace. Second, they would afford remedies to the victims of
harassment, including those victims who have long kept silent.
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190
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal
-system.html [https://perma.cc/9F3D-BDXY].
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